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Abstract: This review paper takes one of the most controversial topics in 
Ergonomics, namely situation awareness, and presents the three key sets of models.  
These models are split into individual SA, team SA and systems SA typologies.  
Despite, or perhaps because of, the controversy, SA has remained an enduring 
theme for research and practice in the domain of Ergonomics over the past two 
decades.  Whilst it is not possible to resolve the controversies and differences 
between the positions, it is possible to show mediation via a contingent approach to 
problem-model matching.  This is fundamental to Ergonomics theory, matching the 
models and methods appropriately to the problem domain being faced. 
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THE STATE OF THE SCIENCE 
 
Situation awareness (SA) is one of the most keenly studied topics in Ergonomics 
(Wickens, 2008; Salmon and Stanton, 2013; Stanton et al, 2010) and also one of its 
most controversial.  The term is used to describe how people, and increasingly entire 
socio-technical systems, become and remain coupled to the dynamics of their 
environment (Moray, 2004).  As a concept it provides researchers and 
practitioners with various models and methods to either describe what SA 
comprises, to determine how individuals, teams or systems develop SA, or to 
assess the quality of SA during task performance (Salmon and Stanton, 2013).  It 
should also provide explanations for what happens when SA is lost, and how it 
affects performance when it is gained (Stanton et al, 2015). 
 
Unusually for an Ergonomics concept it has entered the mainstream lexicon and is 
used in many contexts and professions to refer interchangeably to information that 
resides in people’s heads, minds (Fracker 1991, Sarter and Woods 1991, Endsley 
1995) or even brains (Endsley, 2015); as something which exists in the world, in 
displays or other environmental features (e.g. Ackerman, 1998, 2005); as something 
which is an emergent property of people and their environment (Stanton et al. 2006, 
2009a, 2010); or as a form of distributed cognition (e.g. Hutchins, 1995a & b).  SA has 
been explored in many areas, ranging from military settings (e.g. Endlsey 1993; 
Salmon et al, 2009; Stanton et al, 2006; Stanton, 2014; Stewart et al, 2008), 
transportation (e.g. Ma & Kaber, 2007; Golightly et al, 2010, 2015; Salmon et al, 
2014, Walker et al, 2008, 2009) sport (Bourboussan et al, 2011; James & Patrick, 
2004; Macquet & Stanton, 2014; Neville and Salmon, 2016), health care and 
medicine (Bleakley et al, 2013; Fioratou et al, 2010; Hazlehurst, McCullen & Gorman, 
2007; Schulz, 2013), process control (Salmon et al, 2008; Sneddon et al, 2015; 
Stanton et al, 2009b) and the emergency services (Seppanen et al, 2015; Blandford 
and Wong, 2005).  The papers that deal with the concept are among the most top 
cited in the discipline (e.g. Lee, Cassano-Pinche´ & Vicente, 2005) and the term SA is 
one of the most widely used (Patrick & Morgan, 2010).  A cursory glance at 
GoogleNgram (Figure 1) shows that the term situation awareness was hardly used 
at all within the corpus of English language literature prior to Endsley’s 
(1988),Woods (1988) and other pioneering publications on SA in the late 80’s, with 
the line graph accelerating dramatically from that point forward.  Despite its 
prevalent use in many areas our understanding of SA is still in development (Flach, 
1995; Dekker, 2015). Indeed, in such a fast moving and important part of the 
discipline, a state-of-the-science review is not merely timely, it is probably over-due.   
 
 
 
Figure 1 – Google Ngram plot showing how the use of the term Situation Awareness in the English language 
lexicon has accelerated dramatically since the 1980s 
 
Like so many other Ergonomics concepts, such as workload (Young et al, 2015), trust 
(Kauer et al, 2015), mental models (Revell and Stanton, 2012), and safety (Hignett et 
al, 2013) there is no universally accepted definition of situation awareness.  There 
are definitions that are more popular than others, but there are clear differences in 
how some researchers and practitioners understand and define the concept.  Unlike 
workload, trust and mental models, and as starkly illustrated in recent special issues 
on SA, the topic is unusual for how hotly debated it is (see Carsten and 
Vanderhaegen, 2015; Endsley, 2015; Salmon et al, 2015; Stanton, 2010, 2016; 
Stanton et al, 2015).  Providing that positions do not become too entrenched, for 
everyone else in the profession this debate creates a rich and exciting eco-system of 
ideas around SA theory (Stanton, 2016) and methods (Salmon and Stanton, 2013).   
 
So what, exactly, are the key issues?  Taken at face value the discipline has a 
dominant theory of SA (the three level model put forward by Endsley in a special 
issue of Human Factors in 1995 is undoubtedly the most popular) and associated 
methods with which to convert it into ergonomic practice (of which there are lots of 
examples).  If we define the discipline purely in terms of a pragmatic philosophy, and 
judge success only in terms of practical application, then a state of science review 
will be exceedingly short and uninspiring.  Thankfully, this is not the case.  What 
makes the state of science in SA so captivating is how radically different the concept 
of SA looks when projected through different world-views.  What is becoming 
increasingly evident is that the worldview through which early models of SA were 
projected is quite different from the world-view that exists today.  When Endsley’s 
first paper on SA was published in the 1988 proceedings of the US Human Factors 
and Ergonomics Society Annual meeting, the dominant paradigm of experimental 
and cognitive psychology was very much in the ascendency within the discipline, 
something van Winsen and Dekker (2015) refer to as the ‘first cognitive revolution’.  
Ideas around systems thinking, specifically distributed cognition (e.g. Hutchins, 
1995a, b) and cognitive systems engineering (Rassmussen et al, 1994) were far from 
mainstream and in many cases in their infancy.  Compare this situation with today, 
when there is a much stronger systems focus (Salmon et al, 2015; Dul, et al., 2012) 
and a growing recognition of the importance that systems concepts like complexity 
(Walker et al., 2010), constraints (Vicente, 1999), dynamism (Dekker & Woods, 
2000), multiplicity (Lee, 2001), fuzziness (Karwowski 2000, Lee et al. 2003), 
randomness (Hancock, et al. 2000) and the myriad other terms used to describe the 
kinds of problems Ergonomist are called upon to help resolve.  Nearly thirty years 
since the term situational awareness entered the Human Factors lexicon the 
paradigm has shifted, with the second cognitive (systems) revolution upon us (van 
Winsen & Dekker, 2015). 
 
The goal of this state of science review, therefore, is to convey the richness of the 
debate around SA, to project the concept through different world views, try to 
understand where the contention comes from, how it can be resolved, and its 
important ramifications for the benefactors of the services Ergonomists dispense.  
We argue it is not sufficient to judge any important ergonomic concept purely on the 
criterion of practical expediency.  To continue to advance the state-of-science in this 
review we need to go further.   
 
 
DEFINING SITUATION AWARENESS 
 
At the most basic level, avoiding for the moment any strong links to a particular 
paradigm, situational awareness could be described simply as the ability of actors 
(usually humans, but not necessarily) to become and remain coupled to the 
dynamics of their environment (e.g. Woods, 1988; Moray, 2004).  This is on the 
assumption that being coupled to the dynamics of an environment is a desirable 
state of affairs for behaviours occurring within that environment (but again, not 
necessarily).  In other words, “knowing what is going on around you” or “having the 
big picture” (Jones, 2015, p. 98). 
 
These high-level definitions of SA exhibit a strong ‘situation focus’.  They rely on the 
notion of information, that is, items or artifacts in the situation about which 
individuals require awareness in order to act effectively (Baber, 2004; Endsley, 
1988).  Further, it requires a “mapping of the relevant information in the situation 
onto a mental representation of that information within the [individual]” (Rousseau, 
Tremblay & Breton, 2004, p. 5).  The term ‘mental representation’ reflects two 
aspects of ‘awareness’.  Firstly, that information elements are structured and that SA 
is not merely about the presence or absence of discrete elements but also their 
interconnection.  Billings (1995) talks of an “abstraction within our minds” which 
reflects a second aspect of awareness, that it is hypothetical in nature (Bryant et al., 
2004).  ‘Awareness’ of a situation by an individual is not a canonical model (e.g. 
Banbury, Croft, Macken & Jones, 2004), rather, it is “a representation that mirrors, 
duplicates, imitates or in some way illustrates a pattern of relationships observed in 
data or in nature […]”, “a characterisation of a process […]” (Reber, 1995, p.465).  In 
some form or other SA needs to provide individuals with “explanations for all 
attendant facts” (Reber, 1995; p. 793) in order for them to make better decisions 
and benefit from improved performance.  A key issues is that explanations for 
attendant facts do not necessarily require a particularly rich or detailed model of the 
situation.  Indeed, it would be a highly inefficient representation if it did, and one not 
likely to have been supported by several millennia of human evolution.  On the 
contrary, there is robust evidence (e.g. Gobet, 1998; Chase & Simon, 1973) that the 
better the mental representation (or awareness), the more parsimonious it is; the 
more parsimonious, the more that the ‘information in working memory’ upon which 
awareness is based (e.g. Bell & Lyon, 2000) is forced into higher, more implicit levels 
of abstraction (Walker et al, 2009).  In terms of the situation focus, then, the paradox 
is that the better a person (or ‘agent’s’) ‘mental theory’ of their situation the ‘less’ 
likely it is to have a direct one-to-one mapping to the object or situation that is being 
perceived. 
 
High-level definitions of SA also carry with them a certain linear or sequential 
flavour.  Many models of SA, including the most dominant (e.g. Endsley, 1995), 
assume that “humans typically operate in a closed-loop manner” (Endsley, 1995, p. 
33).  Whilst there can be little doubt that human performance does indeed rely on a 
cycle of input-processing-output-feedback, this does not need tobe the case all the 
time.  There are many examples from the psychological and human factors literature 
where a larger proportion of behaviour than is often acknowledged is feed-forward 
(Plant and Stanton, 2013).  Tasks such as driving, for example, which are routine and 
well-learned can often be performed on the basis of well-developed mental theories 
that require minimal input to guide effective behavior (Stanton et al, 2007; Walker et 
al., 2009c).  Consider, for example, the concept of Driving Without Attention (May & 
Gale, 1998) or mode errors in which ‘knowledge in the head’ (awareness) overrides 
‘knowledge in the world’ (the actual situation: see Stanton & Walker, 2011).   
 
As well as linearity and sequence, high-level definitions of SA also carry with them a 
‘normative’ flavour, the tacit assumption being that the objective situation provides 
a reference point for judging ‘goodness’ or ‘badness’ of SA (Endsley, 1988, p. 793).  
SA, however, is created for a purpose (Patrick & James, 2004) and that purpose is to 
generate better situations to be aware of.  Smith and Hancock (1995) put it that SA 
can be viewed as “a generative process of knowledge creation” (p. 142) in which 
“[…] the environment informs the agent, modifying its knowledge.  Knowledge 
directs the agent’s activity in the environment.  That activity samples and perhaps 
anticipates or alters the environment, which in turn informs the agent” (Smith & 
Hancock, 1995, p. 142) and so on in a cyclical manner.  Smith and Hancock refer to 
SA as ‘constructive’, which is to say the agent or actor is a part of the situation they 
find themselves in and can influence its dynamics.  In other words, they are not a 
passive observer, rather, they are an agent in an interactive system (Stanton and 
Walker, 2011; Plant and Stanton, 2012).  Clearly, SA is more complex than the 
everyday usage of the term might suggest.   
 
 
THE PROBLEM DOMAINS 
 
The definition of SA has changed and developed over the past 25 years, reflecting a 
change in foci of the Ergonomics discipline as well as the facets of SA.  Early 
definitions of SA focused on the individual person, as defined by Endsley: 
 
“Situational awareness is the perception of the elements in the environment within 
a volume of time and space, the comprehension of their meaning and a projection of 
their status in the near future” (Endsley, 1988). 
 
As research interest in SA grew, so it expanded from individuals to teams.  
Definitions of SA came to reflect this also: 
 
“the shared understanding of a situation among team members at one point in 
time” (Salas et al., 1995, p. 131)  
 
Contemporary research into Systems Ergonomics has led to an interest in applying 
SA across socio-technical systems.  Again this has led to new definitions, such as: 
 
“activated knowledge for a specific task within a system….[and] the use of 
appropriate knowledge (held by individuals, captured by devices, etc.) which relates 
to the state of the environment and the changes as the situation develops” (Stanton 
et al, 2006, p. 1291). 
 
In aviation, for example, one could study the awareness of individual pilots, 
specifically the pilot flying.  Or it could be expanded to include the aircrew, not just 
the pilot flying but the captain, engineer/navigator, cabin or cargo crew.  The 
analysis could also include the flight deck instruments, flight deck computer, flight 
director, autopilot, air traffic management system, flight data recorders, and so on 
(Stanton et al, 2010; Sorensen et al, 2011).  After all, these system agents (i.e. both 
human and non-human entities) also have to be aware of their situation in order to 
function as they should, or at the very least, help human agents to do so.  It is 
possible to go even further than this, to consider the wider system of agents and 
actors within which the aircraft is operating: the air traffic management and control 
personnel and systems, tower control, ground control, ground staff, flight operations 
staff, other aircraft, even much higher level entities such as organisations and entire 
infrastructures.  From a linear, sequential and normative perspective on SA this 
might seem controversial, yet these factors are present in recent disasters such as 
Air France 447 (Salmon et al, 2016).  Here the aeroplane and cockpit systems were 
not aware of the current airspeeds.  Following the autopilot’s disconnection in 
response to this, the aircrew were then unaware of why the autopilot had 
disconnected, the key flight parameters that led to the disconnection, and the 
control inputs needed to create a better situation.  Added to this is that each of flight 
phases represent different ‘situations’ for the system as a whole, but within these, 
the situation is changing dynamically, moment-by-moment, for each of the 
individual agents.  So not only is consideration of human and non-human agent 
awareness becoming increasingly important given technological advances such as 
artificial intelligence and advanced automation, but so too is the notion of multiple 
‘agents’ cooperating over time in order to remain coupled to the dynamics of their 
environment.  Issues like these lie at the heart of Socio-Technical Systems (STS) 
approaches (Walker et al, 2009).  From this perspective, rather than simply defining 
the characteristics of individual elements and seeking to combine these, one has to 
study the system at the appropriate level, be it individuals, teams or entire systems.  
We will use this idea of levels of analysis to frame the SA theories and methods in 
the following sections.   
 
 
THEORETICAL MODELS OF SA 
 
In the previous section three distinct types of SA models were identified: individuals, 
teams and systems.  The theoretical bases for these models are further explored in 
this section. 
 
Models accounting for situation awareness held by individuals 
Early models of SA focussed on individual operators and how they cognitively 
acquired SA during task performance (e.g. Adams, Tenney & Pew, 1995; Bedney and 
Miester, 1999; Endsley, 1995; Smith & Hancock, 1995).  Heavily psychology-based, 
these models attempted to explain the processes underpinning the awareness held 
in the minds of individual operators, that is, SA as experienced in the mind the 
person (Stanton et al, 2010; Endsley, 2015).  This focus incorporates the 
psychological processes involved (e.g. mental models, schema, perception, 
comprehension) and the nature of SA itself (e.g. the person’s SA comprises 
knowledge about x, y, and z).  Two of these models in particular stand out in the 
literature (Wickens, 2008), one being by far the most popular, the other receiving 
increasing attention as individual models begin to be integrated with systems 
models (e.g. Stanton et al, 2009a, b).  Both are shown, with others, in Table 1.   
Table 1 - Theories that account for Situation Awareness held by Individuals 
 
 
Definition Author Theoretical 
Underpinning 
Origin Google 
Scholar 
Citation 
Perception of elements, comprehension of meaning and projection of future 
status 
Endsley 
(1988) 
Three-level model Started with 
aviation, later 
spread to other 
domains 
2253 
Situation awareness is adaptive, externally-directed consciousness that has its 
products knowledge about a dynamic task environment and directed action 
within that environment. 
Smith & 
Hancock 
(1995) 
Perceptual cycle model Air traffic control 204 
Situation awareness is based on the integration of knowledge resulting from 
recurrent situation assessments. 
Sarter & 
Woods 
(1991) 
Working memory, mental 
models, situation 
assessment awareness 
Aviation  273 
“…an abstraction that exists within our minds, describing phenomena that we 
observe in humans performing work in a rich and usually dynamic 
environment.” 
Billings 
(1995) 
Information processing 
theory 
Aviation 31 
Situation awareness is knowledge of current and near term disposition of both 
enemy and friendly forces within a volume of airspace.  
Hamilton 
(1987) 
Three-level model Military airspace 6 
SA contributed to good performance, it is not synonymous with it. It is possible 
to have good SA but still not be a good pilot because of poor motor skills, 
coordination or attitude problems. Conversely, under automated flight 
conditions it is possible to have good performance with minimal SA. 
Adams, 
Tenney  & 
Pew (1995) 
Perceptual cycle model, 
working memory 
Aviation 33 
SA is the pre-requisite state of knowledge for making adaptive decisions in 
situations involving uncertainty, i.e. a veridical model of reality. 
Taylor (1990) Theories of attention and 
cognition 
Military, air traffic 
control and 
nuclear power 
272 
Endsley’s three-level model (1995a) has undoubtedly received the most attention 
with almost 2249 citations recorded for the original paper in the Scopus database 
(Scopus, 15th February 2016).  This establishes it as the most cited paper on SA and 
indeed one of the most cited Ergonomics papers of all time. The information 
processing-based model describes SA as an internally held cognitive product 
comprising three levels: perception (level 1), comprehension (level 2) and projection 
(level 3), which feeds into decision-making and action execution.  Level 1 SA involves 
perceiving the status, attributes and dynamics of task-related elements in the 
surrounding environment (Endsley, 1995).  According to the model a range of factors 
influence the data perceived, including the task being performed, the individual’s 
goals, experience, expectations and also systemic factors such as interface design, 
level of complexity and automation.  To achieve Level 2 SA, the individual interprets 
the level 1 data and comprehends its relevance to their task and goals.  Level 3 SA 
involves forecasting future system states using a combination of level 1 and 2 SA-
related knowledge, and experience in the form of mental models.  By these means 
individuals can forecast likely future states and use this to take action.   
 
Endsley’s model foregrounds cognitive models of information processing, and 
evidence of this can be seen in the loose parallels that can be drawn between more 
basic Input-Processing-Output models of cognition (Stanton et al, 2001).  Endsley’s 
model is of course more complex and nuanced than this, but the hereditary line is 
apparent and entirely consistent with the zeitgeist of cognitive psychology evident at 
the theory’s inception in the 1980’s.  Smith and Hancock’s (1995) ecological 
approach to SA is different and offers a useful contrast.  It is based on schema theory 
(Plant and Stanton, 2013), in particular Neisser’s (1976) perceptual cycle model. On 
these terms, Smith and Hancock describe SA as a: 
 
‘generative process of knowledge creation and informed action taking’ (1995, p. 
138).  
 
Neisser’s model describes the cyclical nature of perception and actions, showing 
how our interaction with the world is directed by internally held schemata or mental 
templates, and in turn how the outcome of our interactions then serves to modify 
the initial schemata, which in turn directs further interactions.  Using this model, 
Smith and Hancock (1995) argued that SA is a sub-set of working memory but, more 
importantly, that it neither resides exclusively in the world nor exclusively in the 
person, but instead arises through the interaction of the person with the world.  This 
is an important point of departure.  Smith & Hancock (1995) describe SA as 
‘externally, directed consciousness’ that is an ‘invariant component in an adaptive 
cycle of knowledge, action and information’ (p. 138). It is argued that the process of 
achieving and maintaining SA revolves around internally held schema, which contain 
information regarding certain situations. These schema facilitate the anticipation of 
situational events, directing an individual’s attention to cues in the environment and 
directing their eventual course of action.  An individual then conducts checks to 
confirm that the evolving situation conforms to their expectations.  Any unexpected 
events serve as a prompt for further search and explanation, which in turn modifies 
the operators existing model.   
 
Models based on the notion that SA resides in the minds of individuals provide some 
satisfactory answers to certain types of problem.  They provide a ready explanation 
for how SA works in some situations, and practical methods to enable SA of this type 
to be captured in an expedient way.  They provide less satisfactory answers for other 
types of SA issue.  They tend not to acknowledge that good SA should help the actor 
to create a better situation to be aware of, that knowledge in the head (or 
expectancy) can enable actors to create a rich awareness of their situation from very 
limited external stimuli, and that normative performance standards against which to 
judge the ‘rightness’ of SA do not exist in many tasks, and may in fact be undesirable.  
These fundamental limitations in the individualistic/cognitive approach to SA can be 
distilled into a set of tacit assumptions about SA itself; that it is static and normative.  
This is not to suggest such models are not effective in certain practical situations, but 
it is important to acknowledge that in applying individualistic versions of SA certain 
assumptions are being made.  It is fair to say that if the part of the socio-technical 
system under analysis can be usefully regarded as stable, normative, closed loop and 
deterministic, then stable, normative, closed loop and deterministic approaches are 
entirely appropriate.  Many practical problems do indeed take this form (e.g. highly 
scripted tasks in which deviations from normative performance standards are not 
desired such as a pilot conducting pre-flight checks with checklists), but not all.  
From this has emerged the need for other researchers to project SA through 
different lenses, including teams and systems. 
 
Models accounting for situation awareness held by teams 
The problem spaces in which Ergonomics researchers and practitioners operate are 
frequently characterised by the presence of teams (Annett and Stanton, 2000).  
Teams are defined as “a distinguishable set of two or more people who interact 
dynamically, interdependently and adaptively toward a common and valued goal, 
who have each been assigned specific roles or functions to perform and who have a 
limited life span of membership” (Salas, Prince, Baker and Shrestha, 1995).  Salas 
(2004) suggests that the characteristics of teams include meaningful task 
interdependency, co-ordination among team members, specialised member roles 
and responsibilities, and intensive communication.  It is not surprising, then, that 
researchers quickly began to examine SA in team environments (Endsley, 1993; Salas 
et al, 1995; Shu and Furuta, 2005; Wellens, 1993; Table 2). 
 
Table 2 - Definitions accounting for Situational Awareness held by Teams 
 
 
 
 
Theory  Domain of 
Origin 
Applications Authors Theoretical Underpinning Google Scholar 
Citation 
Team SA  Aviation  Military aviation 
maintenance 
Endsley & Robertson 
(2000) 
Three-level model  100 
 
Inter- and intra-
team SA 
Military Military Endsley & Jones (2001) Three-level model  140 
Team SA  Generic None Salas et al. (1995) Three-level model, team work theory 482 
Team SA  Military Military Wellens (1983) Three-level model, distributed decision-
making model  
144 
 
Many early team SA applications involved scaling Endsley’s model up to the team 
level, incorporating the related concepts of team SA (the degree to which every 
team member possesses the SA required for his or her responsibilities; Endsley, 
1989) and shared SA (the degree to which team members have the same SA on 
shared SA requirements; Endsley and Jones, 1997).  Using the three level model as 
its basis, this approach to team SA argues that that team members have distinct 
portions of SA, but also overlapping or ‘shared’ portions of SA.  Successful team 
performance requires that individual team members have good SA on their specific 
elements and the same SA for shared SA elements (Endsley and Robertson, 2000).  
 
As above, while this approach provides satisfactory answers to some types of team 
SA questions it is less satisfactory for others (Stanton et al, 2001).  As a result, two 
team SA models have received particular attention in the literature: Salas et al’s 
(1995) team SA model, and Shu and Furuta’s (2005) mutual awareness model.  Salas 
et al. (1995) argued that team SA comprises individual SA and various team 
processes.  The critical component of team SA, according to Salas et al, is 
communication.  They argue that the perception of SA elements is influenced by the 
communication of mission objectives, individual tasks and roles, team capability and 
other team performance factors.  Salas et al. (1995) further argued that schema 
limitations can be offset by information exchange afforded by communication and 
coordination between team members.  The comprehension of this information is 
affected by the interpretations made by other team members, so it is evident that 
SA leads to SA and also modifies SA.  In other words, individual SA is developed and 
then shared with other team members, which then develops and modifies team 
member SA.  Thus a cyclical process of developing individual SA, sharing SA with 
other team members and then modifying SA based on other team members SA is 
apparent.  This again is another point of departure.  Salas et al. (1995) conclude that 
team SA ‘occurs as a consequence of an interaction of an individual’s pre-existing 
relevant knowledge and expectations; the information available from the 
environment; and cognitive processing skills that include attention allocation, 
perception, data extraction, comprehension and projection’ (Salas et al., p. 125).   
 
Shu and Furuta (2005) expanded team SA models by proposing the concept of 
mutual awareness, which is conceptually similar to Endsley’s shared SA.  They argue 
that team SA comprises both individual SA and mutual awareness.  This is the mutual 
understanding of each other’s activities, beliefs and intentions (Shu and Furuta, 
2005).  They further describe how team SA is a partly shared and partly distributed 
understanding of a situation among team members.  For example, in the cockpit, 
mutual awareness would be achieved when both the pilot flying and the pilot not 
flying are able to understand each other’s behaviours and motives when dealing 
with an in-flight problem.  Shu and Furuta (2005) defined team SA as, ‘two or more 
individuals share the common environment, up- to-the-moment understanding of 
situation of the environment, and another person’s interaction with the cooperative 
task.’ (Shu and Furuta, 2005, p. 274). 
 
Models based on the notion that team SA relies on a combination of individual and 
shared awareness also reveal some fundamental limitations in the 
cognitive/experimental psychology approach.  This time it is the idea that shared SA 
is equivalent to identical SA, and once again, while the notion of teams admits the 
possibility of greater degrees of change and dynamism, the normative nature of SA 
tends to remain.  As above, this is not to suggest that such models are not effective 
in practical situations, but it is again important to acknowledge that in applying 
several of the most popular team-SA approaches certain assumptions are being 
made.  Upon closer inspection they provide less than satisfactory answers to some 
forms of practical problem.   
 
Models accounting for situation awareness held by sociotechnical systems 
For a concept that began in the world of cognitive psychology SA is no different to 
the Ergonomics discipline more generally.  The paradigm is shifting, however, and 
the strategic direction of the discipline is anchored firmly to increasing extents of 
systems thinking (e.g. Dul et al., 2014; Walker et al, 2010; Walker, 2016).  A distinct 
part of the ‘ergonomic offer’ to stakeholders, therefore, is its role within systems 
and SA is naturally an important part of this.   
 
Systems thinking presents some distinct challenges for SA.  Socio-Technical Systems 
(STS) describe a combination of people (‘socio’) with technical systems that interact 
so as to support some organisational activity.  Typically it involves many stakeholders 
(with different goals) and is governed by organisational policies, rules and culture, 
and may be affected by external constraints such as national laws and regulatory 
policies. A cornerstone of the STS concept is that interacting combinations of people 
and systems are non-deterministic, but in a desirable way.  It is about designing 
systems such that advantageous ’jointly optimised’ behaviours emerge from low 
level processes, of which one is undoubtedly SA.  STSs are inherently complex, with 
this complexity particularly manifest  in high-technology and safety-critical domains 
(i.e. aviation, aerospace, nuclear power, chemical and petroleum process industries 
and defence).  In all these domains, and many more besides, close coupling and 
interactive complexity leads to unexpected ways for systems to fail (Stanton and 
Walker, 2011; Salmon et al, 2013; Perrow, 2001).  Whilst it is self-evident that that 
the complexity of STSs, comprising many agents, elements, subsystems and their 
interconnections it is less obvious that such systems are non-reductive.  In other 
words, it is not easy to disaggregate complex systems into smaller units as one could 
with more traditional linear systems (Walker et al, 2010).  This reductionistic 
approach has been the cornerstone of the ergonomics’ discipline’s roots in 
experimental cognitive psychology, offering both an explanation for SA’s roots in 
similarly reductionist modes of thought, but also a challenge for increasingly 
systemic ways of thinking (van Winsen & Dekker, 2015).  A list of theories that try to 
account for systemic SA is shown in table 3. 
 
Table 3 – Theories that account for Situation Awareness as a Systems Phenomenon 
 
 
 
Theory  Domain of 
Origin 
Applications Authors Theoretical Underpinning Google 
Scholar 
Citation 
Distributed 
cognition approach  
Tele-operation  Tele-operations Artman & 
Garbis (1998) 
Distributed cognition theory  120 
Military awareness 
team SA model  
Process 
control 
Artificial 
intelligence 
Process control Shu & Furuta 
(2005) 
Three level model , shared 
cooperative activity theory 
(Bratman, 1992) 
74 
Distributed SA 
model  
Maritime Military, maritime, energy distribution, aviation, 
air traffic control, emergency services, road and 
rail transport 
Stanton et. al 
(2006) 
Perceptual cycle (Neisser, 1976) 
Distributed cognition theory 
(Hutchins, 1995) 
Distributed SA theory (Artman & 
Garbis, 1995) 
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SA was first discussed at a systems level by Artman & Garbis (1998) who called for a 
systems perspective SA.  It is also a theme picked up on by Shu and Furuta (2005), 
albeit one that attempts to enhance the individualistic three level model via 
cooperative activity theory (Bratman, 1992).  Stanton et al’s (2006) model is perhaps 
the closest the discipline currently has to a systems view of SA, to the extent that the 
‘system view’ in question is most firmly couched in systems theory.  It is 
underpinned by three theoretical concepts: schema theory (e.g. Bartlett, 1932 – 
both genotype and phenotype schema), Neisser’s (1976) perceptual cycle model of 
cognition and, of course, Hutchin’s (1995b) distributed cognition approach.  In this 
model SA is viewed as an emergent property of collaborative systems, arising from 
the interactions between agents, both human and technological.  According to 
Stanton et al (2006; 2009a, b) a system’s awareness comprises a network of 
information on which different components of the system have distinct views and 
ownership of information.  Scaling the model down to individual team members 
brings Neisser’s perceptual cycle, as it was originally envisaged, into more clear 
focus, showing where in the cycle individuals are and what is happening as they 
traverse it  (Neisser, 1976).  At the individual and team levels, people possess specific 
genotype schema that are developed during task performance by task relevant 
features; during task performance, the more generic phenotype schema comes to 
the fore (Plant and Stanton, 2014, 2015).  It is through this task and schema driven 
process that the notion of shared SA (e.g. Endsley & Robertson, 2000) into question.  
This is because rather than possess shared SA (which suggests team members 
understand a situation or elements of a situation in the same manner) the model 
instead suggests team members possess unique, but compatible, types of 
awareness.  Team members experience a situation in different ways as defined by 
their own personal experience, goals, roles, tasks, training, skills, schema and so on.  
Compatible awareness is what holds distributed systems like these together (Stanton 
et al, 2006; 2009a, b; Stanton, 2014).  Each team member has their own awareness, 
related to the goals that they are working toward. This is not the same as other team 
members, but is such that it enables them to work with adjacent team members.  
Although different team members may have access to the same information, 
differences in goals, roles, the tasks being performed, experience and their schema 
mean that their resultant awareness of it is not shared.  It is different yet 
compatible, and collectively required so that the system as a whole can perform the 
collaborative task taking place within it.   
 
The compatible SA view does not discount the sharing of information, nor does it 
discount the notion that different team members have access to the same 
information; this is where the concept of SA ‘transactions’ applies (Sorensen and 
Stanton, 2015).  Transactive SA describes the notion that DSA is acquired and 
maintained through transactions in awareness that arise from communications and 
sharing of information.  A transaction in this case represents an exchange of SA 
between one agent and another (where agent refers to humans and artefacts).  As 
agents receive information, it is integrated with other information and acted on, and 
then passed onto other agents.  The interpretation on that information changes per 
team member.  For example, when ATM provides instruction to an aircraft in a 
particular phase of flight, the resultant transaction in SA for each pilot is different, 
depending on their role (pilot flying or pilot monitoring).  Each pilot is using the 
information for their own ends, integrated into their own schemata, and reaching an 
individual interpretation.  An exchange rather than a sharing of awareness. 
Transactive SA elements from one model of a situation can form an interacting part 
of another without any necessary requirement for parity of meaning or purpose; it is 
the systemic transformation of situational elements as they cross the system 
boundary from one team member to another that bestows upon system SA an 
emergent behaviour.  Flowing from this theory are a set of tenets that serve as a lens 
through which future systems SA concepts can be critiqued or indeed the tenets 
themselves modified (Stanton et al, 2006; Stanton, 2016): 
 
1. Situation awareness is an emergent property of sociotechnical systems. 
Accordingly, the system represents the unit of analysis, rather than the 
individual agents working within it; 
2. Situation awareness is distributed across the human and non-human agents 
working within the system; 
3. Systems have a dynamic network of information upon which different 
operators have their own unique view of, and contribution to; somewhat 
akin to a “hive mind” (Seeley et al, 2012).  The compatibility between these 
views is critical to support safe and efficient performance, with 
incompatibilities creating threats to performance, safety and resilience; 
4. Systemic SA is maintained via transactions in awareness between agents.  
These exchanges in awareness can be human to human, human to artefact, 
and/or artefact to artefact and serve to maintain, expand, or degrade the 
network underpinning the awareness within it; 
5. Compatible SA is required for systems to function effectively: rather than 
have shared awareness, agents have their own unique view on the situation 
which connect together to form systemic SA; and 
6. Genotype and phenotype schema play a key role in both transactions and 
compatibility of SA. 
 
The DSA approach is one of a small number of systems SA approaches.  It has been 
useful to show some of the differences that emerge when SA is projected through a 
systems lens.  In representing a point of radical departure from some other 
approaches it has been a good exemplar (Stanton et al, 2015; Salmon et al, 2015).   
 
One final but important question needs to be asked.  Is the concept of SA useful?  
Does it result in improved performance?  The assumption throughout this review is 
that yes, it is useful.  There is growing evidence form laboratory studies that using SA 
principles results in improved performance.  Indeed, in a recent review of the field, 
Wickens (2008) present a strong case for the value that SA has to offer the science of 
Ergonomics, and the number of citations and the use of the term in everyday 
language attests to that.  Interestingly, however, the relationship between SA and 
task performance was initially difficult to prove (Endsley, 1995).  It is unquestionably 
the case that good task performance can occur despite poor SA and vice versa, so 
clearly the relationship is more complex than a simple one to one SA/task 
performance mapping.  Current but research is providing the much needed evidence 
and insights (Griffin et al, 2010; Sorensen and Stanton, 2013; Sorensen and Stanton, 
2016; Rafferty et al., 2013; Walker et al, 2009).  These studies suggest that DSA is not 
only a useful concept but it is also correlated to task success or failure.  Different 
models of SA are also useful, but perhaps in different circumstances and for different 
reasons. 
 
CONCLUSIONS FOR THE FUTURE OF SA 
 
Recent debates in the literature have tended to be somewhat adversarial, with the 
perceived merits of one approach being compared with the perceived demerits of 
another (Endsley 2015; Salmon et al, 2015; Stanton et al, 2015).  This approach can 
be useful to drive out valid points of issue and subject theories and concepts to a 
stress test.  Beyond that is a more measured picture, indeed, one that goes to the 
heart of wider methodological issues in Ergonomics.  Simply put there is no one best 
theory, rather, it depends on the fundamental nature of the problem to which 
different SA approaches are being applied (Stanton et al, 2010).  All have a role to 
play.  If the practical SA issue being examined can be reasonably characterized as 
stable, relying on deviations from accepted normative practices, and focusing on 
individual personnel, then there are SA theories which match perfectly to this 
situation and will deliver the insights needed.  If, on the other hand, the problem can 
be characterized by a sociotechnical system in which SA is neither normative or 
stable, and resides as a systems phenomenon rather than individual one, then 
likewise, other approaches matched to these features will deliver the needed 
insights.  This is summed up diagrammatically in Figure 2.  The key issue is that an 
overly doctrinaire and rigid approach, not flexible to the nature of the problems 
being tackled, will a) fail to deliver the required insights and/or b) do so with 
excessive analytical effort compared to alternatives and/or c) in the worst case 
retard understanding and diminish the reputation of the discipline.     
 
To end on a positive note is to say that the future is bright for SA research and 
practice.  Systems continue to become more complex and technology-driven, which 
in turn raises important questions around awareness and how best to support it 
across individuals, teams, organisations, and entire systems.  In addition, critical new 
SA research questions continue to reveal themselves, such as how human operators 
can exchange awareness with artificial intelligence, how we can study SA in teams 
comprised entirely of non-human agents, and how to design advanced automation 
systems where awareness is distributed (e.g. vehicle to vehicle and vehicle to 
infrastructure road transport environments).  The concept’s popularity is such that it 
continues to be applied in new domains and there is no doubt new questions will 
arise, and new areas to be explored. The challenges and opportunities for SA are 
limitless.   
 
 
 
Figure 2 – Different approaches to SA match to different features of ergonomic problems.  By its 
nature, the more systemic the SA model the more of the problem space it can operate within, 
although other approaches may prove more practically expedient.  The real challenge going forward 
is to become better at this matching rather than compete one approach with another. 
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